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In this paper, we apply a convex hull approach to counterfactual analysis of trade openness 
and growth. The experiments we choose evaluate the importance of trade openness for growth 
across African countries. Specifically, we ask the question “what would happen if African 
countries were more open?”. The evidence indicates that several countries don´t fall within 
the convex hull of the observed data and therefore counterfactual inferences are risky. This 
conclusion is at odds with the literature arguing that greater trade openness would 
unequivocally lead to higher growth in Africa. 
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1. Introduction
A common aim of many empirical economic growth studies is to assess whether a pro-openness 
trade policy has a causal effect on either the growth rate or the level of GDP.  A vast amount of 
literature, for example, has assessed the causes of the East Asian Miracle [World Bank (1993)]. An 
obvious and salient fact is that these countries experienced an extremely rapid export growth, a 
feature which can be seen as a critical variable in the economic take-off of the initial NIEs (Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) since 1960. Subsequently, the second tier of NIEs (Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia) also experienced rapid growth in the 1980s, to be followed in the 1990s by 
China.
1 In many interpretations, this “opening-up” is seen as having provided a key stimulus to set in 
motion a cumulative process of high investment, high savings, high profits, and high growth.
2 On the 
other hand, one has to admit that empirical studies that link “pro-openness” to growth have been 
plagued by problems of causality, country heterogeneity, and endogeneity. Nevertheless, drawing on 
the  experiences  of  the  NIE´s,  “pro-openness”  is  now  part  of  the  standard  policymaking  toolkit 
recommended to countries wishing to raise their growth rates.  
This problem of interference involves “what if” questions and statements and thus counterfactual 
outcomes. In our specific context, the counterfactual question is as follows: what would the growth 
rate of some countries in the sample have been, had they decided to liberalise their trade regime in 
the hope of emulating Asia’s success? One may also ask the hypothetical question what would the 
growth rate of open economies have been, had they decided to close their economies? Given the 
widespread scepticism regarding the possibility of making sound inference based on cross-country 
data,  we  present  a  first-of-its-kind  convex  hull  analysis  within  the  empirical  growth  literature 
evaluating  the openness-growth  nexus.
3 In other words, our modest  methodological contribution 
here is to suggest a framework to deal with counterfactual questions in a straightforward manner.
This paper is structured in the following way. In the second Section, we briefly review the principles 
underlying the convex hull analysis.
4 In Section 3 we apply the methodology to a dataset which has 
been used recently in the growth literature and we simulate several counterfactual histories of the 
                                                
1 Recently,  China’s  export  growth  has  attracted  a  great  deal  of  attention.  How  has  China  achieved  this 
phenomenal export growth? Recent studies highlight the sophistication of Chinese exports, the diversification 
of its product mix, and the growth in new varieties. Sophistication leads to higher productivity growth and 
diversification might aid growth by facilitating new export discoveries. See Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), 
Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2006). 
2 The precise mechanism through which countries commence on a rapid growth path is the subject of much 
discussion.  An important  mechanism  identified  is  that  pro-openness  policies  expose  firms  to  foreign 
competition, technology and can thus lead to productivity gains. 
3 This is not the only way one might assess the counterfactual problem. Billmeier and Nannicini (2007) have 
recently applied matching estimators drawn from the treatment literature to make the comparison between 
“open” (i.e. treated) and “closed” (i.e. control) countries. Levine and Renelt (1992) and Temple (2000) have 
applied extreme-bounds analysis to show that the results of cross-country growth regressions are not robust to 
even small changes in the set of explanatory variables.3
level of selected trade openness variables. In Section 4, we confront the numerical underpinnings 
with empirical data. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Convex Hull Methodology: A Primer
This section outlines the dangers of extreme counterfactuals, the resulting model dependence of 
statistical inference, and how to identify extreme counterfactuals using the convex hull methodology 
and complementary distance-from-the-data techniques suggested by King and Zeng (2006, 2007).
5
Figure  1 illustrates the basic idea  using Vamvakidis´ (2002) cross-country dataset for  the years 
1970-1990.
6 The scatterplot presents each country’s trade share against its average real GDP per 
capita growth rate. The graph vividly illustrates the concept of model dependence and its relation to 
the distance from the data. It is evident that predictions of the linear, logarithmic, and quadratic 
models are virtually the same for trade shares up to 0.5 – King and Zeng refer to this as “nearby” the 
data. However, the farther one drifts away from the data, the larger the difference between the three 
model’s predictions becomes. In other words, it is not the data that drives the results but assumptions 
regarding the functional form of the relationship. Thus, inference becomes highly model dependent -
“hazardous”, as King and Zeng have phrased it. 
Figure 1 illustrates that there is an enormous variation in trade openness and growth rates across 
countries. It is also apparent that most African countries reside in the lower left part of the graph. In 
comparison with the rest of the world, as indicated in the graph, they are thus relatively closed. 
Furthermore, over the period 1970-1990 the African countries exhibit low average growth rates.
7
                                                                                                                                                  
4 There is not enough space here in which to provide a complete description of the convex hull methodology 
and mathematical proofs. Readers interested in detailed descriptions of the methodology are invited to consult 
textbooks on the subject, including de Berg et al. (2000). 
5 In two recent papers, King and Zeng (2006, 2007) have addressed the dangers of extreme counterfactuals in 
political science. They have exemplified the methodology using two examples. The first evaluates inferences 
on the effects of democracy. They demonstrate that many counterfactual questions are far from the data and 
therefore drawing conclusions about the effects of democracy are indefensible. The second example applies 
the  convex  hull  methodology  to  studies  analysing  international  peacebuilding  strategies.  Again,  they 
demonstrate that inferences about the effects of UN interventions are highly sensitive to model specification 
and robust inferences are unallowable. 
6 For a thorough description of the dataset, see Section 3.  
7 Sub-Saharan Africa has been the slowest growing region in the world. Several African countries have even 
experienced absolute declines in living standards, i.e. growth disasters. For an analysis of Africa’s growth 
experience, see Easterly and Levine (1997).4
Figure 1: Illustrating Model Dependence
Note: Triangles represent African countries, circles the rest of the world.
However, as is usually the case, reality is more complicated. In the majority of cases, models involve 
more than one explanatory variable. How can we assess model dependence in multivariate analyses? 
An answer to this question is provided by the convex hull methodology. In mathematics, a convex 
hull of a set of points is the smallest convex polygon that contains each of the points. Expressed in 
clear terms, the convex hull of a set of points S in n dimensions is the intersection of all convex sets 
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The intuition is fairly straightforward. For two explanatory variables, the convex hull is given by a 
polygon with extreme data points as vertices. This is easiest to demonstrate graphically. In Figure 2 
the convex hull is the smallest convex set that contains the data.
8 Intuitively, counterfactuals outside 
the convex hull  of the observed data are generally  farther away from the data. More precisely, 
counterfactual  “what  if”  questions  that  appear  inside  the  polygon  involve  interpolation.  On  the 
contrary, counterfactual questions that appear outside the polygon require extrapolation and will 
therefore be sensitive to at least some modelling choices that are not based on empirical evidence. In 
other words, calculating the convex hull provides a natural check of the “distance” from the data, 
                                                
8 The convex-hull estimator of a boundary or frontier is also a cornerstone of any “'data envelope analysis” 
(DEA).5
thereby  alerting  one  to  the  dangers  of  counterfactuals  which  require  extrapolation.
9 Figure  2 
provides a diagrammatic illustration of this point.
Figure 2: The Convex Hull for Two Explanatory Variables








Although Figure 2 portrays the convex hull concept for the two dimensional case, the concept is 
well-defined for any number of dimensions. For three dimensions, the concept hull is calculated via 
“shrink mapping”. For more than three dimensions, the concept is difficult to visualize, but the 
mathematical concept is straightforward.
10
In a nutshell, what the convex hull methodology offers is an easy-to-apply method that reveals 
whether or  not  model  dependence is  present without having to run many  alternative  models.  It 
applies to nearly every class of model whether they are estimated or not, conditional only on the 
choice  of  a  given  set  of  explanatory  variables.  If  an  analysis  fails  the  convex  hull  test,  i.e.  a 
counterfactual falls outside the convex hull of the data, then we know that it will fail other sensitivity 
tests too, but we avoid having to estimate a large number of alternative models.
11
                                                
9 Models are typically written “globally”, i.e. for any value of the explanatory variable. However, the models 
are  only  relevant    “locally”,  i.e.  nearby  the  observed  data.  One  may  therefore  say  that  the  convex  hull 
methodology allows to determine where “local” ends and “global” begins. Ho et al (2007, p. 13), for example, 
have proposed to drop all observations that are outside of the convex hull before estimating the model.
10 In computational geometry, numerous algorithms have been proposed for computing the convex hull of a 
finite set of points, with various computational complexities. Barber et al. (1997) have demonstrated that Qhull
works efficiently in 2 to 8 dimensions (see http://www.qhull.org/). Our estimates below are based upon the 
WhatIf program which  offers easy-to-apply  methods to  evaluate counterfactuals.  The  suggested  algorithm 
eliminates the most time-consuming part of the problem: the characterization of the convex hull itself. In 
addition, the remaining (implicit) point location problem can be expressed as a linear programming exercise, 
making  it  possible  to  take  advantage  of existing  algorithms  designed  for  other  purposes to  speed  up  the 
computation. See Stoll et al. (2006). 
11 Sala-i-Martin (1997), for example, has run two million regressions to identify robust relationships in the 
economic growth literature.6
The convex hull criterion leads to a qualitative 1/0-decision. Complementary, we therefore measure 
“distance” between two observations with a quantitative measure. Note that “distance” is a measure 
of similarity between observations in the multivariate space defined by the entire dataset. In order to 
determine  the  amount  of data “nearby”  the  counterfactual,  King and  Zeng (2006,  p.  137) have 
proposed a rule of thumb based upon the data’s geometric variability and “distance from the data ” 
measured using the Gower metric.
12 The Gower distance measure provides quantitative information 
about  “nearness”, i.e.  it  provides  a metric  on  which the  accuracy of  policy  conclusions can  be 
assessed. Only counterfactuals that have a distance from the data that is smaller than the data’s 
geometric variability are deemed “nearby”. This leads to a purposeful discussion of the potential 
uses of empirical growth estimates in policy discussions.















where K is the length of the vector x and  k r is the range of the data. Gower's distance is one of the 
most  popular  measures  of  proximity  for  mixed  data  types.  It  allows  one  to  calculate  for  each 
counterfactual, x, the fraction of observations that is nearby X. If G² = 0, then x and the row of X in 
question are identical, and the larger 
2
ij G , the more different the two rows are.  An interesting feature 
is that the measure can be interpreted as the proportion of the distance across the data. For example, 
G² = 0.5 means that to get from one point to the other, one needs to travel 50% of the way across the 
dataset. Intuitively, any G² > 1 falls outside the convex hull of X. We can sum up the argument in 
this section by noting that the Gower distance measure enables us to distinguish between different 
shades of "nearness". This feature makes the Gower distance approach a helpful complement to the 
dichotomous convex hull criterion described above. 
The next section summarizes the findings of various counterfactual simulations using the convex 
hull methodology, and discusses their use in economic growth analysis.  
3. Counterfactual Simulations
To anchor our results in the existing growth literature, we draw on the Vamvakidis (2002) dataset. 
Vamvakidis (2002) has presented historical evidence of the openness-growth nexus. The dataset 
consists of repeated country cross-sections for the periods 1920-1940, 1950-1970, and 1970-1990. 
Besides  average  GDP  per  capita  growth  and  various  trade  openness  measures,  the  dataset  also 
                                                
12 The  geometric  variability  is  also  referred  to  as  squared  generalized  standard  deviation  or  generalized 7
contains several other macro variables like initial GDP, the investment share, population growth, 
enrollment  rates,  inflation  and  the  black  market  premium.  In  order  to  measure  trade  openness, 
Vamvakidis  (2002)  has  tested  six  distinct  approaches:  the  Sachs  and  Warner  (1995)  openness 
dummy, the average tariff rate, the average non-tariff barrier from the Barro and Lee dataset, the 
ratio of import duty revenues to total imports, the average trade share and the average trade share 
PPP adjusted (1970-1990 period). Out of these six measures only the Sachs and Warner (1995) 
openness  dummy  and  the  average  trade  share  turned  out  to  be  robust  in  an  extreme-bounds 
analysis.
13 Furthermore, the results indicate that openness had a significant effect on growth after 
1970 but not before. The size of the coefficients indicates that open economies have grown, on 
average, by 1.5-2.0 percentage points per year faster than closed economies. Given these estimation 
results,  we  use  the  1970-1990  subsample  for  our  empirical  analysis  below.
14 Furthermore,  we 
consider only the two robust openness measures. 
The obvious question is how valuable is this kind of estimation result for the design of policy? 
Armed  with  this  data  and  the  convex  hull  methodology,  we  conduct  various  counterfactual 
experiments. Consistent with the philosophy of the endeavour, the experiments we choose should 
evaluate the importance of openness for growth. Specifically, we ask the question “what would 
happen if African countries were more open?”.
Several  counterfactual  experiments  are  constructed.  Counterfactual  A considers  the  growth 
implications of an increase of the trade share to the average level of (i) the 24 high-income OECD 
countries, (ii) the EU-15 countries or (iii) the Asian countries in the dataset. These scenarios are 
referred to as A(OECD), A(Europe), and A(Asia), respectively. Counterfactual B takes into account 
that some African countries already have a higher trade share than the corresponding comparative 
value. In scenario B we therefore only consider those countries that actually “improve” their degree 
of openness. The values of all other variables are assumed to remain at their actual values.
15
The  details  of  our  calculations  are  straightforward.  First,  we  evaluate  whether  or  not  a  certain 
country’s counterfactual falls in the convex hull spanned by the dataset. Second, we determine the 
average portion of the data that is “nearby” the counterfactual. In Table 1 we present the empirical 
results for the counterfactual experiments.
Viewing the data through this prism, several clear-cut results emerge. In the specification without 
the investment share (specification I), only four African countries (Madagascar, Tunisia, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) are located inside the convex hull. This number is even smaller for scenarios B and C. 
                                                                                                                                                  
variance, see Cuadras and Fortina (1995) and Cuadras et al. (1997).
13 See Vamvakidis (2002) pp. 62-64 for a detailed description of the dataset and the estimation results. The 
WhatIf-software does not allow for NA´s. We therefore only consider countries without data gaps.
14 The sample consists of 152 countries, 46 of which are African. Vamvakidis (2002) distinguishes two model 
specifications, one excluding and one including the investment share as explanatory variable, see columns (9) 
and (10) in Table 1, p. 63. Both specifications are considered here, referred to as Specification I and II. 
15 Therefore, the counterfactual analysis is subject to the Lucas (1976) critique, in that the experiments proceed 
by changing sets of model parameters while holding others constant.8
Evaluating the complementary distance rule of thumb shows that the average portion of data nearby 
the counterfactual is, for all scenarios, greater for countries that fall inside the convex hull of the 
data: for instance, 0.34 for the “in hull”, and 0.24 for the “not in hull” countries in the A(Asia)-
experiment. Similar results emerge from model specification II, see the lower panel of Table 2, but 
the number of “in hull” countries is even smaller.
16
Table I: Evaluating Alternative Counterfactuals about Africa´s Trade Openness
Specification I
Scenario A(OECD) A(EU-15) A(Asia) B(OECD) B(EU-15) B(Asia)
No. of 
Countries































(Not in Hull 
only)
0.25 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.25
Specification II
Scenario A(OECD) A(EU-15) A(Asia) B(OECD) B(EU-15) B(Asia)
No. of 
Countries




2 1 1 1 1 1
Countries Tunisia, 
Zimbabwe










(Not in Hull 
only)
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.21
Notes: In both specifications, the trade share has been used as the openness measure. Specification I (II) has been estimated 
without (with) the investment share as an explanatory variable. Other regressors include initial income, secondary school 
enrollment, population growth, inflation and the black market premium. See Vamvakidis (2002), p. 63.  
                                                
16 Qualitatively identical results were obtained for the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness dummy variable.  
All of these excercises using the dichotomous openness measure give qualitatively identical results to those 
using the continuous trade openness measure. Thus, the results are not driven by some unusual feature of our 
data. Interested readers may obtain these supplementary results upon request.9
The straightforward interpretation arising from Table 1 is that the counterfactuals are not based in 
factual evidence since the countries under consideration do not share a common support. For most 
African countries the distance from the counterfactual to the data is too large and therefore the 
question  posed  cannot  be  reliably answered.  Unfortunately,  this  conclusion  is  at  odds  with  the 
literature arguing that greater openness unequivocally gives room for growth in Africa.
17
By way of example, the presentation of the numerical convex hull results is now complemented by 
considering two further graphical representations of the results for scenario A(Asia). For ease of 
interpretation, Figure 3’s categorical boxplot shows that the portion of “nearby data” for the four “in 
hull” countries (Madagascar, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are above the “not in hull” countries’ 
median.














Note: The  plot  has  been  produced  for  specification  I,  i.e.  without  the  investment  share  as  an  additional 
explanatory variable.
Finally, to aid in the interpretation of the results Figure 4 displays four cumulative frequency plots of 
the  Gower distances,  each  of  which  compares  one  of  the  four  “in  hull”  countries  Madagascar, 
Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to “not in hull” Gambia. Each line gives the cumulative distribution 
                                                
17 One might argue that this finding is consistent with the view that economic performance across former 
African  colonies  is  still  influenced  by  different  types  of  initial  conditions  that  the  European  powers 
encountered.  In  Sub-Saharan  African  colonies  where  settler  mortality  was  high,  extractive  institutions 
designed to transfer rents to Europeans emerged. Such institutions did not create effective property rights, they 
did  not  generate  incentives  for  investment,  education  and  innovation,  and  they  consequently  retarded 
economic growth. Since institutions have a tendency to persist, this led to different paths during the critical 
junctures facing these former colonies. stayed in relative poverty. See Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002).10
of the Gower distance measure. It is apparent that the four “in hull” countries generally have a larger 
portion of the data within a given distance.
Figure 4: Cumulative Frequency Plots of the Gower Distances




































































































































































































































Note: Gower distances to five counterfactuals, Scenario A(Asia): Cumulative frequencies of Gower distances. 
Solid lines indicate “in hull”, dashed lines “not in hull” countries.
To summarize, this analysis provides sufficient grounds for concluding that inference from the three 
counterfactual  scenarios  considered  here  is  highly  model  dependent.  Thus,  caution  should  be 
employed  in  interpreting  counterfactuals  about  trade  openness  and  growth.  In  essence,  trade 
openness itself seems to be no simple blueprint for success.
One way to assess the reasonability of our estimates is by looking at how stable are our convex hull 
estimates.  Schrot  (2007)  and  Sambanis  and  Michaelides  (2009)  have  recently  warned  that  the 
predictions of the convex hull approach may heavily rely on the econometric specification and could 
fail delivering  sensible numbers. In particular, Sambanis and Michaelides (2009) have demonstrated 
using Monte Carlo experiments that as the number of variables (k) grows and/or the number of 
observations (n) declines, the convex hull diagnostics may lead researchers to infer that the data are 
likely  to  suffer  from  a  high  risk  of  extrapolation  bias  although  this  does  not  have  to  be  true. 
Therefore  they  conclude  that  the  convex  hull  diagnostics  calculated  above  may  provide  too 
conservative for data sets in economics and political science. This small sample size n/k problem 
encountered in the convex hull methodology is due to the complex geometry of multidimensional 
space and raises concerns about how confident we can be in the counterfactual analysis presented 11
above.
18 There is a simple way to examine whether we face this problem in the data: we carefully 
inspect the robustness of the results to changes in the set of conditioning variables.
Much economic research has been devoted in recent years to determining the set of explanatory 
variables that explain cross-country variation in growth rates. In an influential paper, Levine and 
Renelt  (1992)  have  employed  a  variation  of  extreme  bounds  analysis  to  test  the  robustness  of 
conventional growth regression coefficients to changes in the set of conditioning variables. They 
conclude that the results in the literature are rather fragile, with the only robust determinants of 
growth being physical capital investment, initial income, secondary school enrollment and openness. 
In contrast, they demonstrate the fragility of a host of fiscal and monetary variables, as well as 
measures of political and economic stability and economic distortions. Given their results and the 
n/k problem mentioned above, we have finally re-estimated the convex hull diagnostics for this 
smaller set of conditioning variables. The results indicate that the assignment of countries inside or 
outside the convex hull is sensitive to the n/k problem. For the A(OECD) scenario we find that 12 
countries  are  inside  the  convex  hull  of  the  multi-dimensional  space  defined  by  the  variables 
(Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Marocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe), while 18 countries remain outside the hull (Algeria, Botswana, 
Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Egypt,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda).
19
The  corresponding  boxplots  in  Figure  5  are  insightful. The  countries  of common support  are 
characterised by a higher trade share, a higher investment ration, a higher initial GDP per capita and 
a  higher  school  enrollment  rate.
20 The  results  discussed  here  suggest that  a  fruitful  avenue  for 
applied research and a good counterfactual rule of thumb therefore is to consider only the 12 more 
advanced economies for counterfactual policy simulations. 
                                                
18 Sambanis and Michaelides (2009) demonstrate that the small sample n/k problem is most pronounced in data 
sets with a mix of binary and continuous variables. 
19 In unreported estimates we have reduced the number of regressors further to k = 2 (initial income and 
openness). The number of countries inside the hull remains the same providing confidence about the results.
Interested readers may obtain these supplementary results upon request.
20 Equality of means tests indicate significant differences between both groups.12

























































4. Confronting the Numerical Underpinnings with Empirical Data
Modelling exercises of the type presented in this paper are usually done in order to analyse the 
effects of a hypothetical policy reform. In our “what if” case, however, we are able to consider the 
impact of  actual reforms  since many African countries  have  embarked  on programs  of external 
economic liberalization in the 1990s. Has the convex hull classification any bearing on what is 
actually happening in the real world? 
Hence, it is natural to present some empirical evidence about the effects of such policies for the 12 
in-hull vs. the 18 out of hull countries as a robustness check. Is there empirical evidence to support
the in hull vs. out of hull classification presented above? Unfortunately, the connection between 
trade and growth rates is hard to prove empirically and the exact definition of openness remains a 
matter of some dispute. Trade can be restricted in numerous ways, from quotas and tariffs to less 
obvious  measures,  such  as  capital  controls.  A  careful  measure  of  trade  liberalization  needs  to 13
quantify all these restrictions. To get an accurate picture, we employ the trade liberalization data 
from Warcziarg and Welch (2008). More precisely, we have ascertained for all 30 African countries 
in our dataset the year whether and when uninterrupted openness began in the 1990s. 
The question whether or not one economic variable can help forecast another economic variable 
frequently arises in time series analysis and Granger causality tests have proven to be useful in this 
regard. Testing for Granger-causality involves using F-tests to test whether lagged information on a 
variable X provides any statistically significant information about a variable Y in the presence of 
lagged Y. If not, then “X does not Granger-cause Y“. There are several ways in which to implement a 
test of Granger causality. On particularly simple approach uses the autoregressive specification of a 
bivariate vector autoregression. 
There are a few remarks to be made. First, in this study the sample size varies from country to 
country depending upon the timing of trade liberalization. Second, prior to estimation, one has to 
specify the number of lags. This is a crucial step because the causality test results may depend 
critically on the lag structure. In general, both too few and too many lags may cause problems. Too 
few  lags  will  usually  cause  bias  in  the  retained  regression coefficients,  leading  to  incorrect 
conclusions. On the other hand, too many lags waste observations. In our estimates, we pre-tested 
for the appropriate lag length using the Schwartz Criterion. Third, we have used first log-differences
of both series. 
We have divided the 30 African countries into those 12 countries which have reformed policy to 
qualify as “open” and those 18 countries which have followed protectionist and inward-looking 
economic policies in the 1990s according to Wacziarg and Welch´s (2008) dichotomous trade policy 
indicator. Their in-depth work has been very influential, and this is our best estimate of the date for 
the onset of reforms. The regression results for the 12 African countries which have implemented 
programs of external economic liberalization in the 1990s are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Bivariate Granger Causality Tests of the Openness-Growth Nexus




South Africa 1991 0.7866
Zambia 1993 0.0057
Not-in-Hull Countries







Sierra Leone 2001 0.888514
Notes: H0: Openness does not cause GDP. As a measure of openness, we use the ratio of total trade to GDP. 
The original real GDP and trade share data have been extracted from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. The country-specific timing of trade liberalization has been obtained from Wacziarg and 
Welch (2008), Table A-2.
What do  the  findings suggest?  The important message  of  the Granger  causality  tests is  that, if 
anything, trade liberalization had only Granger-caused  growth in one out of eight “out of hull” 
countries at the 10 percent level. On the contrary, two out of four “in hull” countries have witnessed 
a fresh GDP spurt after trade liberalization at the 10 percent level.
21
So  what  can  a  policymaker  learn  from  the  econometric  results? Although  certainly  far  from 
definitive, the lesson is nevertheless striking: Only inside the convex hull, freer trade has helped 
African countries to grow faster. This is suggestive – though limited in number of countries and 
observations - that the convex hull classification of countries provides useful insights and helps to 
unmask differences across countries. All in all, this finding advises against premature counterfactual 
exercises  and  cautions  against  one-size-fits-all  policies  that  disregard  country-specific 
circumstances.
22
5. Summary and Some Concluding Thoughts
Economists have long postulated that openness may raise growth. Despite this great deal of credence 
in  the  modern  growth  literature,  however,  some  deep  scepticism  has  developed  regarding  the 
robustness  of  the  links  between  openness  and  growth.  For example,  in  the  excellent  survey by 
Hallak and Levinsohn (2007), the authors identify three major shortcomings in the cross-country 
evidence.  First,  openness  is  typically  summarized  by  a  one-dimensional  index  that  has  little 
theoretical  foundation. Second,  there  are  several  omitted variables biases,  which  lead  to  results 
which  are  not  robust.  Finally,  there  is  so  much  heterogeneity  in  economic  conditions  across 
countries that it is doubtful that there is a unique mapping of openness into economic growth.
23
This  paper  proposes  a method  for  thinking  about  whether  or  not  a  counterfactual  analysis  is 
meaningful. The convex hull method is quite intuitive: if the counterfactual “what if” scenario lies 
outside the convex hull of the data, this must mean that the counterfactual will be predominantly 
driven  by  the  model  rather  than  the  data.  In  other  words,  predictions  will  be  sensitive  to  the 
assumptions the researcher makes. We explain the method and then provide an example of why 
                                                
21 Expansion in the continent´s largest economy, South Africa, has been boosted by the ongoing construction 
and investment boom as preparations for the 2010 football World Cup gather momentum.
22 Sachs and Warner (1997) have suggested that openness to international  trade had an impact upon growth 
across African countries. However, their evidence suggests that part of Africa´s slow growth also lies with 
natural factors such as being landlocked, natural resource abundance, and tropical climate.
23 Policymakers and researchers face considerable uncertainty given a set of multiple, overlapping theories 
which emphasize different growth channels. Brock and Durlauf (2001) refer to this as „open-endedness“ of 
economic theories, in the sense that one theory being true does not necessarily imply another one is wrong.15
researchers need to be cautious in conducting counterfactual analysis. The counterfactual example 
asks what would happen to Africa´s growth should African countries liberalize their trade regimes.
24
The straightforward interpretation emanating from this paper is that the counterfactuals are not based 
in factual evidence since many countries under consideration do not share a common support. For 18  
African countries the distance from the counterfactual to the data is too large and therefore the 
question posed cannot be reliably answered.
From a methodological perspective, deep scepticism has been brought to bear against  empirical 
cross-country evidence on the trade-growth nexus. Therefore, economists and policymakers face a 
formidable problem. We conclude from the exercise that it is important to check for the existence of 
common support across countries. In fact, the advantage of a convex hull analysis lies in the simple 
guidance for appropriately restricting policy conclusions to specific subsamples. It should therefore 
becomes  an  integral  part  of  the  sensitivity testing  toolbox  of  applied  economists  in  the  future. 
Overall, the results recommend refraining from commenting on the potential effect of greater trade 
openness on growth in most African countries in the 1990s in an unconditional way.
25
We have presented a number of pieces of evidence that we hope will stimulate others to use the 
convex hull methodology in the future and pursuing this debate further. We hope that is what we 
have accomplished here.
                                                                                                                                                  
Furthermore, within each theoretical channel there may be multiple competing measures representing the same 
theory.
24 The question is similar to current debates in the development literature on whether or not we can generalize 
facts learned from randomized experiments. While a program intervention may be successful in one setting, it 
may not be in other settings [see Rodrik (2008)].
25 This conclusion is, for example, consistent with Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). They have found evidence 
for the hypothesis that trade openness isn´t associated with economic growth unlimited as regards substance, 
space and time. In particular, they have argued that the Sachs-Warner (1995) results largely reflected the black 
market premium and the state monopoly on major exports. The Wacziarg and Welch (2008) results on shifts in 
trade policy and outward orientation in the 1990s used above have addressed this critique.16
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